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LIST OF PARTIES 
The parties to this action are: 
1. Utah State Retirement Board, Plaintiff and 
Appellant. 
2. Badi Mahmood, Defendant and Respondent. 
3. Irene Woodside, Defendant. A default judgment 
was entered against Ms. Woodside on September 23, 1987. 
(R. 294-295) 
4. Dale Jackman, Defendant. Mr. Jackman was dis-
missed by Stipulation of the parties and Order of the 
District Court on March 11, 1987. (R. 148) 
5. Bara Investment Corporation, Defendant. Bara 
Investment Corporation was dismissed by Stipulation of 
the parties and Order of the District Court on April 4, 
1986. (R. 175-77) 
6. National Housing and Finance Syndicate, Defen-
dant and Respondent. 
JURISDICTION 
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. S 78-2-2(3)(i) (1986), the 
Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction of this matter. This is an 
appeal of the Trial Court's denial of plaintiff's Motion for 
Leave to Pile a Second Amended Complaint (sometimes referred to 
as "plaintiff's Motion"). 
ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Did the Trial Court abuse its discretion in denying 
plaintiff's Motion? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On December 11, 1985, plaintiff Utah Stats Retirement 
Board brought this action against defendants Badi Mahmood 
("Mahmood"), National Housing and Finance Syndicate ("National 
Housing"), Irene Woodside ("Woodside"), Dale Jackman ("Jackman") 
and Bara Investment Co. ("Bara"). Plaintiff's alleged claims for 
relief are based upon fraud and civil conspiracy. (R. 2-11) 
On April 4, 1986, plaintiff dismissed Bara from the 
suit. The Trial Court approved and ordered the same. (R. 75-77) 
On April 11, 1986, plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint. (R. 
80-91) On March 22, 1987, plaintiff dismissed Jackman from the 
suit. (R. 150-52) The Trial Court approved and ordered the 
same. (R. 148-49) 
On April 8, 1987, plaintiff moved to amend its Com-
plaint for a second time. (R. 155-70) On April 17r 1987, 
National Housing filed a Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff's 
Motion for Leave to File a Second Amended Complaint. (R. 
2 
179-90) On the same date, National Housing moved for summary 
judgment. (R. 172-78) On April 27, 1987, the Trial Court heard 
plaintiff's Motion, National Housing's opposing arguments, 
National Housing's Summary Judgment Motion and plaintiff's oppos-
ing arguments. (R. 269) 
On May 13, 1987, the Trial Court granted summary judg-
ment in favor of National Housing and denied plaintiff's Motion. 
Both rulings are contained in a Minute Entry (R. 269) and an 
Order and Judgment of the Court. (R. 270-71) Based upon the 
Trial Court's ruling, plaintiff and Mahmood stipulated to summary 
judgment in his favor. (R. 274-75) The Trial Court approved and 
ordered the same. (R. 272-73) 
On October 5, 1987, plaintiff filed notice of this 
appeal. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. In early January, 1980, National Housing, in a dou-
ble escrow, exercised an option to purchase 46 acres at the mouth 
of Little Cottonwood Canyon (referred to as the "property") from 
Mr. Reed Jensen for approximately $320,000.00. As part of the 
double escrow, National Housing sold the property to plaintiff 
for approximately $928,000.00. (R. 83, 180) 
2. Prior to purchasing the property, plaintiff 
requested an appraisal from an independent appraiser, Jackman. 
He appraised the property at $950,000.00. (R. 180; William 
Chipman Depo., Exhibit 1A) 
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3. More than a year after the sale, plaintiff 
requested an update of the Jackman appraisal from another inde-
pendent appraiser, John K. Bushnell. He appraised the property 
at $929,600.00. (R. 181; William Chipman Depo., Exhibit IB) 
4. Appraisals and updates done thereafter showed the 
property to decline in value. (R. 181; Chipman Depo., Exhibits 
ID - ID 
5. Two major reasons accounted for the property's 
decline in value: 
(a) In 1981, the year after the sale, Salt Lake 
County enacted the "Salt Lake County Hillside Ordi-
nance," which prohibited construction on slopes of 40% 
or steeper. This functionally precluded use of much of 
the property. (R. 181; Chipman Depo., Exhibit IE - IF) 
(b) Since the sale, real estate values in general 
have fallen. (R. 181; Chipman Depo., Exhibit 1G - 1H) 
No appraiser retained by plaintiff suggested that the original 
appraisal done by Jackman constituted a fraud. (R. 181; Chipman 
Depo., Exhibit IB - 1L) 
6. On or about January 30, 1982, plaintiff received an 
appraisal that valued the property at $510,000.00. (R. 182; 
Chipman Depo., Exhibit ID) On December 11, 1985, plaintiff filed 
the Complaint. (R. 1-9) This was more than three years after 
receiving the 1982 appraisal. (R. 182) 
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7. Plaintiff dismissed Jackman as a defendant, having 
concluded that he did not commit fraud. (R. 151-58; Chipman 
Depo., p. 44) 
8. The only representations relied upon by plaintiff 
in making its decision to purchase the property were those con-
tained in Jackman's appraisal. (R. 182; Russell Hales Depo., p. 
6) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
This Court must determine whether the Trial Court 
abused its discretion when it denied plaintiff's motion to amend. 
The Trial Court properly denied plaintiff's motion to 
amend because it was futile. Plaintiff failed to allege that it 
had a confidential relationship with National Housing, an essen-
tial element of a constructive fraud claim. Plaintiff's response 
to National Housing's summary judgment motion demonstrated that 
it had no evidence that National Housing acted fraudulently or 
that the alleged conduct caused it damage. 
ARGUMENT 
I. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
A. This Court Must Determine That The Trial Court Abused 
Its Discretion Before It Can Reverse The Trial Court. 
Plaintiff only appeals the Trial Court's denial of its 
Motion for Leave to File a Second Amended Complaint. It does not 
appeal the Trial Court's granting of summary judgment in favor of 
National Housing. See Appellant's Opening Brief ("Appellant's 
Brief), p. 1. 
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In order to reverse the Trial Court's denial of 
plaintiff's Motion, this Court must determine that the Trial 
Court abused its discretion. See Stratford v. Morgan, 689 P.2d 
360 (Utah 1984)(stating the standard of review); Westley v. Farm-
ers Insurance Exchange, 663 P.2d 93 (Utah 1983)(stating the 
standard of review). A trial court abuses its discretion when it 
acts "in excess of its authority or in a manner so clearly out-
side reason that its action must be deemed capricious and arbi-
trary." Peatross v. Board of Commissioners of Salt Lake Cityf 
555 P.2d 281, 284 (Utah 1976). Therefore, plaintiff must demon-
strate that the Trial Court's decision was outside of its author-
ity or capricious and arbitrary. Without such a showing, this 
Court must uphold the Trial Court's denial of plaintiff's 
Motion. 
1 In Section B of its brief, plaintiff labels its argument 
"HAD THE TRIAL COURT RULED ON THE MERITS OF PLAINTIFF'S 
MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE A SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT, IT 
WOULD HAVE BEEN ABUSE OF DISCRETION NOT TO GRANT THE 
MOTION." See Appellant's Opening Brief, p. 16. However, 
plaintiff's argument actually contains a discussion of the 
policy to liberally grant leave to amend. See Appellant's 
Opening Brief, pp. 16-18. Plaintiff essentially argues that 
National Housing did not establish that further amendment 
would prejudice it or delay trial. Absent such a showing, 
plaintiff argues that Utah R. Civ. Proc. 15(a) "requires 
that leave be granted." See Appellant's Opening Brief, p. 
17. Plaintiff misstates the standard. 
Plaintiff cites three cases for the proposition 
that leave to amend must be granted absent a showing of 
prejudice or delay of trial. None of those cases "require" 
that the trial court grant leave to amend absent such a 
showing. See Girard v. Appleby, 660 P.2d 245, 248 (Utah 
Footnote continued on next page. 
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B. A Trial Court Properly Denies Leave To Amend If The 
Proposed Amendment Would Be Futile. 
As noted above, a trial court must exercise discretion 
when deciding a motion for leave to amend. A trial court may 
properly deny a motion to amend if it determines the proposed 
amendment is futile. See Bache Halsev Stuart Shields v. Tracy 
Collins Bank & Trust, 558 F. Supp. 1042, 1044 (D. Utah 
1983)(leave to amend should be denied when the proposed amendment 
is frivolous, legally insufficient or subject to dismissal); 
Conrad v. Imatani, 724 P.2d 89 (Colo. Ct. App. 1986)(holding that 
the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied 
plaintiff's motion to amend when summary judgment motion estab-
lished that the proposed amendment was futile). See also 
DeRoburt v. Gannett Co., 551 F. Supp. 973 (D. Hawaii 1982)(leave 
to amend properly denied when proposed amendment would be 
futile); Burt v. Blue Shield of Southwest Ohio, 591 F. Supp. 755 
(S. D. Ohio 1984)(stating these principles). 
Footnote continued from previous page. 
1983)(stating that granting leave to amend is discretion-
ary); Thomas J. Peck & Sons, Inc. v. Lee Rock Products, 
Inc., 30 Utah 2d 187, 515 P.2d 446, 450 (1973)(upholding the 
trial court's decision to grant leave to amend because of no 
prejudice to the other party, but not stating that leave to 
amend was required); Gillman v. Hansen, 26 Utah 2d 165, 486 
P.2d 1045, 1046-47 (1971)(noting that leave to amend rests 
with the trial court's discretion). National Housing 
acknowledges the liberal policy noted by plaintiff. How-
ever, that is not the standard of review this Court must 
employ. On appeal, this Court must determine whether the 
Trial Court abused its discretion. 
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II. PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM FOR CONSTRUCTIVE FRAUD FAILS AGAINST 
NATIONAL HOUSING. 
A. Introduction 
Plaintiff argues that the Trial Court erred in denying 
its motion to amend as to the proposed constructive fraud claim. 
See Appellant's Brief, pp. 18-23. However, plaintiff failed to 
state such a claim against National Housing. 
B. The Applicable Legal Standards 
In Utah, a claim of constructive fraud requires plain-
tiff to establish that the parties had a confidential relation-
ship. "A confidential relationship arises when one party, having 
gained the trust and confidence of another, exercises extraordi-
nary influence over the other party." Von Hake v. Thomas, 705 
P.2d 766, 769 (Utah 1985). See generally 37 CJS Fraud S 2 
(1943). A confidential or fiduciary relationship does not exist 
between a buyer and seller of real property. See Duqan v. Jones, 
615 P.2d 1239 (Utah 1980)(stating the rule); Cole v. Parker, 5 
Utah 2d 263, 300 P.2d 623 (1956)(holding that no fiduciary obli-
gations exist between a buyer and seller of real property). A 
breach of a confidential relationship must lead to damage before 
a party may successfully claim constructive fraud. See Duqan v. 
Jones, 615 P.2d at 1246-48 (stating the rule). Therefore, if no 
confidential relationship exists or no damage results from a 
breach thereof, a claim of constructive fraud fails as a matter 
of law. 
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C. National Housing Owed No Duty To Plaintiff 
Plaintiff does not allege that National Housing had a 
confidential relationship with it. Instead, plaintiff alleges 
that Badi Mahmood (National Housing's retained real estate bro-
ker) had a confidential relationship with it. In its brief, 
plaintiff concedes that the only evidence it has of that rela-
tionship is that Mahmood had previously performed appraisals for 
plaintiff. This falls far short of having gained trust and con-
fidence so as to exercise extraordinary influence (the basis for 
a confidential relationship). 
Whatever position of conflict of interest Mahmood may 
have put himself in (on the one hand as National Housing's bro-
ker, he owed a duty of non-disclosure of National Housing's 
o 
acquisition price, and on the other hand, plaintiff asserts he 
owed a duty to plaintiff to disclose that price), that gives rise 
to no duty on the part of the seller, National Housing, to dis-
close its acquisition price. Plaintiff also urges that Mahmood 
had a duty to disclose that he was receiving $200,000 of the 
sales price and then paying Galen Ross (an officer of National 
Housing), under the table, one-half of that amount. See 
Appellant's Brief, pp. 24-5. The fraud, if any, in this transac-
tion is not against plaintiff, but against National Housing. 
2 "In Utah, as elsewhere, a real estate broker is held to be 
an agent of the property owner for whom he acts. As an 
agent, he owes a fiduciary duty to his principal." Hal 
Taylor Associates v. UnionAmerica Inc.f 657 P.2d 743, 748 
(Utah 1982). 
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The allegations of the proposed amended complaint 
failed to meet the requirements of a claim for constructive 
fraud. Additionally, as shown below, plaintiff suffered no 
injury on account of Mahmood's non-disclosures. For these rea-
sons, plaintiff's proposed constructive claim was futile. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO AMEND 
BECAUSE NATIONAL HOUSING'S SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION WAS 
EQUALLY APPLICABLE TO PLAINTIFF'S PROPOSED AMENDMENT 
A. The Trial Court Correctly Granted Summary Judgment In 
Favor of National Housing 
The gravamen of plaintiff's claims against National 
Housing was that the Jackman appraisal was false and misleading. 
This was plaintiff's basic contention before the motion to amend 
was filed; and, its basic contention in the constructive fraud 
claim. National Housing's summary judgment motion put at issue 
this very contention. 
At the summary judgment stage, National Housing estab-
lished that no evidence supported plaintiff's claim that the 
appraisal was misleading. (R. 179-80) Indeed, the evidence 
established just the opposite: Jackman's appraisal was sound. 
The evidence established that one year after Jackman did his 
appraisal, an independent appraisal by Bushnell valued the prop-
erty at $929,600.00 (an amount greater than the amount plaintiff 
paid for the property). That amount was also very close to the 
amount of Jackman's appraisal. (R. 180-81; Chipman Depo., 
Exhibit IB) Plaintiff, in its response to the summary judgment 
motion, failed to adduce any evidence that the Jackman appraisal 
was false or misleading. 
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Jackman's appraisal was at the heart of every claim for 
relief in the Amended Complaint. (R. 80-91) As close scrutiny 
of the Amended Complaint reveals, plaintiff alleged in each and 
every claim for relief that the misleading appraisal caused it 
damage. Plaintiff also alleged that plaintiff was defrauded 
because the true value of the property was less than what plain-
tiff paid for it. Ld. Plaintiff failed to present any evidence 
that the appraisal was false or misleading, or that the property 
was not worth what plaintiff paid for it. This failure doomed 
plaintiff's case for two reasons. First, the critical element of 
each claim (misrepresentation) failed as a matter of law. Sec-
ond, plaintiff failed to produce any evidence that it was dam-
aged. Accordingly, the Trial Court properly granted National 
Housing's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
B. The Trial Court Properly Denied Plaintiff's Motion To 
Amend As Futile 
As with plaintiff's other claims, its constructive 
fraud claim turns on the basic allegation that the property was 
not worth the $926,000.00 plaintiff paid for it. (R. 166-69); 
Appellant's Brief, pp. 18-23. A review of plaintiff's proposed 
constructive fraud claim illustrates that it simply realleges its 
basic premise with a different label. 
In paragraph 50(a), plaintiff alleges that defendants 
conspired to reap an unconscionable profit. (R. 166) Plaintiff 
argues the same in its brief. See Appellant's Brief, pp. 225-26. 
This allegation implies that National Housing misled plaintiff; 
and, that the property was not worth what plaintiff paid for it. 
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In paragraph 50(c), plaintiff alleges Mahmood failed to 
disclose that he provided Jackman with comparables that exces-
sively or erroneously valued the property. (R. 166) This alle-
gation implies that those comparables, and the appraisal, misled 
plaintiff. It further implies that plaintiff paid more for the 
property than it was worth at the time. 
In paragraph 50(c), plaintiff alleges a civil conspir-
acy regarding the double escrow. (R. 166-67) This allegation 
implies that National Housing acted to defraud plaintiff. 
In paragraph 50(h), plaintiff alleges more about the 
civil conspiracy and the unconscionable profit. (R. 167-68) 
This allegation implies that National Housing misled plaintiff 
into buying the property; and, that plaintiff suffered damage as 
a result. 
Plaintiff's brief, again, demonstrates that the founda-
tional allegation of the constructive fraud claim is the allega-
tion that the Jackman appraisal was fraudulently misleading. 
Plaintiff's brief emphasizes that fact. Plaintiff's brief tries 
to substantiate the allegation by further alleging that Mahmood 
knew what National Housing paid for the property; that Mahmood 
knew that the fair market value was substantially less than 
$927,000.00; and, that Mahmood failed to disclose that the 
Jackman appraisal had faulty comparables. Plaintiff's battle-cry 
seems the same regardless of the name of the claim: It was mis-
led. See Appellant's Brief, pp. 19-21. 
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As National Housing's motion for summary judgment dem-
onstrated, plaintiff's proof of this essential element was 
non-existent. Therefore, the Trial Court properly exercised its 
discretion and denied plaintiff leave to amend as futile. 
Accordingly, this Court should affirm the Trial Court's denial of 
plaintiff's motion to amend. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should affirm the 
Trial Court's decision to deny plaintiff's motion to amend. 
DATED this ^ ^ d a v of / V u ^ ^ 1988. 
- ^ ^ / ^ ^ 
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